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T 
he  changing  composition  of  Federal 
Government  spending  tells  a  story  of 
trends and swings in  national  priorities during 
our  country's  two-century  history.  From  the 
earliest  years  through  the  1920's,  the 
expenditure  side  of  the  Federal  budget 
primarily reflected the nation's  involvement in 
wars.  Expenditures  would  increase to pay  the 
cost  of  a  conflict.  Then,  after  the  war,  total 
spending  would  decline,  and  the  budgetary 
emphasis would shift from  paying for  arms to 
paying interest on a war-inflated public debt. 
Those who worry about today's  national debt 
may derive some comfort from knowing that in 
most years before 1803,  interest on  the public 
debt claimed more than half  of  the outlays  of 
the Federal Government. With the exception of 
veterans'  compensation  and  pensions,  Federal 
spending for  social  welfare  was  virtually 
unknown during the Republic's  first 150 years. 
During  fiscal  year  1976,  expenditures  for 
income  security,  health,  education,  and 
veterans' benefits will account for 53 per cent of 
Federal  buggetary  outlays.  In  contrast,  net 
interest on the public debt now claims about 8 
per cent of the budget. 
Federal spending for social welfare has roots 
in  the Great  Depression.  By  1939,  such 
expenditures had risen to 44 per cent of Federal 
outlays,  or  to over  50  per  cent,  if  veterans' 
services and  benefits  are included.  But  World 
War  I1  reversed  this  trend  by  ending  the 
Depression and by requiring enormous defense 
expenditures. Veterans' benefits increased 
sharply after the war, but Federal spending on 
other welfare programs fell to nearly one-fourth 
the  prewar  dollar amount.  Not  until  the late 
1950's did the Federal Government again spend 
as much on social welfare as it did in 1939. 
Clearly,  major  shifts  in  the  composition  of 
Federal Government expenditures  are  nothing 
new. But the trend of the past 20 years is not a 
repeat  performance  of  historical  cycles  in 
Federal  spending.  It  is  a  compositional  shift 
that underlines a  national commitment  to use 
Federal  spending  as  an  instrument  for 
redistributing  income  in  relatively good  times 
as well as in depressed economic periods. Thus 
the  percentage  of  Federal  outlays  going  for 
purchases of goods and services (two-thirds of 
which  is  currently  for  national  defense)  has 
declined from 64 per cent in 1956 to 55 per cent 
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in  1966 and, with  accelerating momentum, to 
35 per cent in 1976. A previous article has dealt 
with  the  implications  of  changes  in  Federal 
spending for goods and services.'  This article is 
about the other principal subdivisions of 
Federal  outlays-interest on  the  public  debt, 
domestic transfer payments,  and grants-in-aid 
to state and local governments. 
INTEREST ON THE NATIONAL DEBT 
All but 1.3 per cent of  the gross debt of the 
U.S. Government is in the form of  marketable 
bonds,  notes,  and  bills  and  certain 
nonmarketable  series  issued  by  the  U.S. 
Treasury. Issues of several Federal Government 
agencies, such as the Export-Import Bank, the 
Tennessee  Valley  Authority,  and  the  Federal 
Housing  Administration,  account  for  the 
remainder.  A large proportion of gross Federal 
debt--43 per cent at the end  of  1975-is  held 
by  Federal Government  agencies,  primarily in 
trust  funds,  and  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks. 
Thus, much  of  the interest  paid  on the  gross 
Federal debt amounts to internal  bookkeeping 
transactions that do not affect the public. 
Net Federal indebtedness is that amount that 
the Federal Government owes  to domestic and 
foreign  investors.  To the  extent  that  the  net 
Federal debt is held by  U.S.  investors, interest 
payments do not constitute a net burden on this 
nation's  economy.  No  external burden  is 
involved on domestically held debt because tax 
receipts  from  Americans  are  used  to  pay 
interest  to Americans.  However,  even  though 
"we  pay  interest  to ourselves" on  a  national 
debt that "we  owe  to ourselves," a  burden to 
current and future generations from past  wars 
has  been  said  to  exist.  This  burden,  the 
argument goes, is  in  the form  of  what  might 
have  been,  had  wars  not  interrupted  the 
development of resources and the advancement 
of technology. According to this point of  view, 
private  investment  has  been  crowded  out  by 
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Government borrowing over the years,  and the 
amount of interest on the Federal debt can be 
considered  a  rough  estimate of  the additional 
national  income  that  would  have  been 
generated  by  that  foregone  investment.  This 
argument has merit, but it is by no means clear 
that Government borrowing always crowds out 
private  investment,  or  that  Government 
spending  slows  technological  change.  In 
particular,  when  resources  are  underutilized, 
deficit spending by the Federal Government can 
stimulate  economic  activity,  including  private 
investment. 
Americans do not  hold  as much  of  the  net 
Federal debt as they  did  formerly;  a  growing 
share is owed  to investors  outside  the United 
States.  Foreign  holdings  of  U.S.  debt  have 
increased  dramatically  in  relative  importance 
since 1969.  Increases in  the early 1970's  were 
due to an overvalued dollar, but more recently 
oil exporting  nations  have accumulated  dollar 
claims  in  several  forms,  including  U.S. 
Government  securities.  At  the  end  of  1975, 
investments  of  foreign  and  international 
accounts included  an estimated 20  per cent of 
the net Federal debt. 
The real  burden  of  externally  held  Federal 
debt  is  borne  by  Americans  when  foreigners 
convert this debt to dollars, or use the interest 
on  it to buy  U.S.  goods  and  services.  To the 
extent  that  U.S.  debt  is  held  by  foreigners, 
Americans are borrowing from future domestic 
output to satisfy current demands. On the one 
hand, it is fortunate that other countries  have 
been  willing  to  accumulate  dollar  balances 
because  if  economic activity is  constrained  by 
an  inflation-fighting  policy,  an  increase  in 
exports would require an offsetting decrease in 
domestic purchases of goods and services. On 
the  other  hand,  were  inflation  not  such  a 
problem, this period of  underutilized resources 
would be an ideal time for the stimulus that a 
major increase in exports would provide. 
Various categories of domestic investors hold 
net  Federal debt. Individuals  hold  the largest 
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share,  about  one-fourth  of  the  total. 
Commercial  banks hold  almost  as much.  The 
remaining 30 per cent that is not part of foreign 
accounts investment  is divided  up among state 
and local governments, thrift institutions, 
insurance companies,  other  corporations, 
nonprofit institutions, corporate pension  trust 
funds,  dealers  and  brokers,  and  other 
miscellaneous investors. 
Interest  payments  from  the  Federal 
Government to  the  private  sector  have  risen 
sharply in recent years, for four reasons.  First, 
the rate of growth of  the net Federal debt has 
accelerated. From 1964 to 1969, it grew 1.2 per 
cent; from 1969 to 1974, 17.7 per cent. Then, 
in fiscal 1975 alone, privately held Federal debt 
grew  17.5 per cent, a postwar  record.  Second, 
interest  rates  have  trended  upward.  Between 
1964  and  1974,  the  average  annual  yield  on 
3-month Treasury bills increased  122 per cent; 
on 3 to 5 year issues, it increased  92 per cent. 
Bond  interest-the  yield  on  securities  with 
many years to maturity-increased 60 per cent 
or more,  with the greater increases  associated 
with the shorter maturities. Third, the maturity 
distribution  of  the  Federal  debt  has  shifted 
toward  shorter issues,  where  rates  have  been 
rising the fasted2  In 1964, the average time to 
maturity of marketable public debt was 5 years; 
in  1974,  it averaged  3 years.  In  1964,  39  per 
cent of  the marketable public debt came due 
within  the year; in  1974,  that percentage  had 
risen  to  52.  Over  most  of  this  period,  the 
upward  push  on  interest  payments that came 
from  the  shift  to the shorter  maturities  with 
rapidly rising rates was offset  by  the fact  that 
the  shorter  debt  instruments  carried  lower 
yields.  But  this  normal  relationship  between 
yield  and  maturity  underwent  a  twist  in 
mid-1973,  so that for  more than a  year  there 
A major reason for this shift is the law that limlts the rate of interest that the 
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the  market rate,  bonds  of  longer  matunties cannot  be  sold.  Thus  the  U.S. 
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and refunding operations.  By do~ng  so, of course.  11  has pushed up short rates 
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was a fourth reason  why  interest  payments on 
the  Federal  debt  were  rising-Treasury  bill 
rates were higher than those on notes at a time 
when  (and  largely  because)  a  growing 
proportion  of  the  Federal  debt  was  being 
shifted into bills. 
Although  the  size  of  the  net  Federal  debt 
jumped  almost  30  per  cent  during  calendar 
1975, interest payments grew less than half as 
fast, thanks primarily to falling interest  rates 
on Treasury bills. A further decrease, to 2 years 
9 months,  in  the marketable debt's  length  of 
time to maturity helped the Treasury draw even 
greater  benefit,  for  the  short  term,  from 
declining interest rates. 
The Federal Government's interest  payments 
to the public have increased dramatically in the 
past 10 years, but so have most other economic 
variables  measured  in  dollars,  because  of 
inflation.  Relative  magnitudes,  therefore,  are 
more  meaningful.  As  a  share  of  the  nation's 
potential output, Federal interest  payments to 
the public have stayed about the same for many 
years. 
DOMESTIC TRANSFER PAYMENTS 
While  all  nonpurchase expenditures  by  the 
Federal Government must be transfer payments 
of some sort, the category  known  as domestic 
transfer payments includes  only certain  types. 
In  particular, it excludes interest payments on 
Federal debt and subsidy payments to business 
and government enterprises.  Domestic transfer 
payments are payments directly to (or in behalf 
of)  individuals  because  of  their  personal 
(nonbusiness) special  circumstances.  Included 
in  this  category  are  social  insurance  and 
veterans'  benefits;  food  stamp  expenditures; 
retirement  benefits  for  railroad  workers,  civil 
servants,  and  military  personnel;  benefits  to 
individuals  who  are  learning,  training,  or 
employed  under  manpower  programs;  and 
supplemental  security  income  benefits  for  the 
aged,  blind,  and  disabled.  This  is  not  an 
exhaustive  list  of  Federal  spending for  social 
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welfare.  Other "human  resources" programs 
are financed  by  the Federal  Government 
through  grants-in-aid  to state  and  local 
governments.  But  these  expenditures,  con- 
sidered in the following section, are not Federal 
transfers directly to persons. 
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, 
domestic  transfer  payments  are  expected  to 
total $155 billion, almost 5 times more than 10 
years earlier, and more than double the amount 
in fiscal year 1972. Inflation explains some, but 
not  all, of  this growth--consumer  prices  have 
not  doubled  in  the  past  decade.  Most  of  the 
rapid  increase  in  transfer  payments  is 
attributable  to  escalating  benefits  under  old 
welfare  programs  and  the  adoption  of  new 
programs  since  the  early  1960's.  These  new 
programs did  not  come  about by  chance.  For 
better  or  worse,  the  economic  and  political 
climates of the 1960's favored the increased  use 
of  Federal  expenditures  as  a  mechanism  to 
reduce  the  hardships  of  those  living  on  low 
incomes,  as  well  as  a  means  to compensate 
those  unduly  harmed  by  recession  and 
inflation. 
In  the  absence  of  compensatory  measures, 
inflation  and  economic  growth  redistribute 
income and  wealth  in  favor  of  the  productive 
members of society and against  those who are 
not  employed.  One of  the ways  that Congress 
has offset prosperity's redistributive effects and 
simultaneously  acted  to support  persons  with 
low  incomes  is  by  legislating  substantial 
increases  in  old  age,  survivors,  and  disability 
benefits.  Between  1965 and  1973,  partly 
because  of  such  legislation  and  partly  as  a 
result of  the increases  in  average benefits  and 
in  number  of  beneficiaries,  total  payments 
under these Social Security programs rose at an 
average annual rate of  14 per cent. Even faster 
rates of  growth were recorded by  Federal civil 
service retirement  benefits,  military  retirement 
pay,  and  manpower  training  programs. 
Excluding  unemployment  benefits,  which  will 
be  discussed  separately,  the  slowest  growing 
domestic transfer programs between 1965 and 
1973  were  railroad  retirement  and  veterans' 
benefits  which  grew  at  about  10  per  cent 
annual  rates.  The medicare,  food  stamp,  and 
coal  miner  programs  were  begun  and  grew 
rapidly  in  those  years.  All  told,  the  average 
annual  rate  of  growth  of  domestic  transfer 
payments,  excluding  unemployment  benefits, 
came to 15 per cent from 1965 to 1973. 
National income grew at an 8 per cent  rate 
during that period, substantially  less than the 
15  per  cent  increase  in  transfer  payments. 
Clearly, income was distributed from those who 
worked to those who did not. About half of the 
8 per cent rate of gain in  money income of  the 
employed  represented  an  increase  in 
purchasing  power,  and  this  was  much  more 
than enough to finance the increase in domestic 
transfer payments. Even though transfers grew 
faster,  their  absolute  increase  of  $60  billion 
from  1965 to 1973  was  dwarfed  by  the  $500 
billion increase in  national income,  four-fifths 
of  which  was  employee  compensation.  Only 
relative  after-tax  shares  of  national  income 
shifted  toward  the nonproductive and  those of 
low  productivity. 
The story  was  quite  different  between  1973 
and 1975. The two fiscal years from  mid-1973 
to  mid-1975,  or  fiscal  years  1974  and  1975, 
included  five quarters of  recession.  Because of 
continued  inflation,  national income did  grow 
in  money terms over that period, by about a 6 
per  cent  annual  rate.  But  domestic  transfer 
payments jumped at a 23 per cent annual rate. 
A shift  in  relative  shares  occurred,  and  this 
time some of the gain by  transfer recipients did 
come at the absolute expense of  the employed. 
This is because real output declined, so that the 
redistributed purchasing power had to be spent 
on fewer goods and services. 
Payments  in  most  categories  of  domestic 
transfers  continued  to rise  from  mid-1973 to 
mid-1975.  Coal  miner  benefits  were  the 
exception: they were flat. Consumer prices rose 
at a 10 per cent average annual rate in those 2 
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years,  which  partly  explains  the  accelerated 
rates  of  growth  of  civil  service  retirement 
benefits (25 per cent), military  retired  pay  (20 
per  cent),  veterans'  benefits  (15  per  cent), 
medicare  (25  per  cent),  and  other  Social 
Security benefits (15 per cent). To some extent, 
growth  of  benefits  in  these categories  reflects 
the  recession.  Relatively  poor  economic 
conditions  tend  to  encourage  retirement,  for 
example. 
The most pronounced impact of recession on 
domestic  transfer  payments  is  shown  in 
unemployment  benefits,  which  increased  more 
than 2% times between 1973 and 1975, and by 
food stamp payments,  which  increased 67  per 
cent.  These increased  transfers are similar  to 
the  others  in  that  they  do  represent  a 
redistribution  of  income  from  the working  to 
the idle  population.  They  differ,  however,  in 
that the unemployed are cyclically idle, drawing 
benefits  that  will  eventually  decline  as  the 
economy recovers. 
During the  current  fiscal  year  which  ends 
June 30, 1976, domestic transfers are estimated 
to total 18 per.cent more than in fiscal 1975. At 
least half of  this increase is attributable to the 
still  depressed ,economy-the  high  unemploy- 
ment  benefits  and  other  payments  that  are 
larger under such conditions.  On the brighter 
side, however, the economy is  recovering from 
the  recession  of  1974-75,  and  the increase  in 
real  national  income  will  again  be  far  more 




Federal  grants-in-aid  to  state  and  local 
governments  have  grown  almost  as  fast  as 
domestic transfer payments in the past decade. 
The growth  rates of  the two would  have been 
even  closer,  had  the  Federal  Supplementary 
Security Income  program, a domestic transfer 
category new  in 1974, not replaced  some state 
income  assistance  programs  that  had  been 
funded by  Federal grants. For fiscal year 1976, 
grants-in-aid  are estimated to total $60 billion, 
compared  to $155 billion  in  domestic transfer 
payments. 
More  than half  of  Federal  grants-in-aid  to 
state  and  local  governments  finance  social 
welfare activities.  The programs receiving the 
most  money  include  aid  to  families  with 
dependent  children,  school  lunch  and  other 
child nutrition, medicaid, and several programs 
in education, training, and social services. The 
shorter end of  Federal grants-in-aid  (about  45 
per cent of the total) goes for various purposes. 
Highways and general purpose fiscal assistance 
(primarily  revenue  sharing)  split  half  of 
nonwelfare grants.  Other programs  supported 
include  environmental  improvement,  urban 
mass  transit,  airport  construction,  scientific 
research,  community  and  regional  develop- 
ment,  natural  resource  and  energy,  and  law 
enforcement and justice. 
The amounts of  aid granted to states by  the 
Federal  Government differ.  On  a  per  capita 
basis, states with relatively more poverty tend 
to  receive  the  most  Federal  social  welfare 
assistance.  The big, thinly  populated  western 
states  also  rank  high  in  per  capita  grants 
because,  on  a  per  person  basis,  they  receive 
more Federal money for highway construction, 
and  because  they  share,  with  the  Federal 
Government,  revenues  from  extensive  Federal 
lands within their boundaries.  Ranking lowest 
in  per  capita  aid  are  the  midwestern  states, 
where Federal land  is  scarce, where  relatively 
few  people  live  on  low  incomes,  and  where 
highway construction is closer to average on  a 
per person basis. 
CONCLUDING NOTE ON 
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
In  the past  several  years,  Federal  spending 
has  grown  rapidly  because  of  the  very  large 
increases  in  domestic  transfer  payments  and 
grants-in-aid  to state  and  local  governments. 
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weighted  heavily  toward  human  resources,  or 
.  '  social  welfare,  programs.  Their  intent,' as 
indicated  earlier  in  this article,  has  been  to 
.  better spread  the  costs  of  the  battles  against 
inflation  and  recession,  and  to reduce income 
inequality. Because of  the failures and abuses 
of  some  programs,  and  the high  cost  of  the 
total package,  many  people,  both  liberal  and 
conservative,  are  disillusioned  with  Federal 
welfare activity.  But  there can  be little doubt 
that  despite  the  waste,  fraud,  and  economic 
inefficiency of  Federal  redistributive spending, 
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the overall effect of these programs has been to 
alleviate  those severe  hardship  cases  that are 
directly  due  to  inadequate  income.  Money 
measures of income still show more than 10 per 
cent  of  U.S  residents  living  below  the 
arbitrarily defined poverty level.  But, as Edgar 
Browning establishes, money income data miss 
the  fact  that  many  welfare  programs  provide 
income in kind. In other words, he argues, few 
Americans  today  live  below  a  poverty level  of 
consumption. ' 
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